Who knew Ben Brown could be so interesting. The data still tells us… Not a starter or closer….

Hello Friends! 

Who knew Ben Brown could be so interesting.  As much fans may want Ben to be a starter, or be as a closer…. The data still tells us… No…. No….

This is a huge string. Once folks started asking questions, I started digging and it just kept going.

Let’s get to it.

No – building stamina isn’t Brown’s Key… because Stamina Isn’t the Core Issue

While Brown’s performance drops after the third inning as a starter (5.40 ERA in innings 4-6), this decline does not appear to solely due to physical fatigue. It’s his pitch mix. Hitters adjust to his two-pitch mix after seeing it multiple times in a game.

Building stamina might extend his outings, but it wouldn’t necessarily solve this adjustment problem. His struggles in later innings suggest a limitation in his current approach as a starter, not a lack of endurance that stamina training alone could fix.

Bah!  That doesn’t show anything. How do you know it’s not a core issue? 

If stamina were the core issue, we would expect Brown’s fastball velocity to drop significantly in later innings, reflecting physical fatigue. However, his fastball velocity remains stable at 95-97 mph across both starting and relief roles, with no notable decline reported in the data for later innings.

For example, in his 7-inning start on May 28, 2024, he maintained effectiveness (0 ER, 10 SO), suggesting that when he performs well, his velocity and pitch quality hold up. The lack of velocity drop points to hitter familiarity or execution issues, not a lack of endurance, as the primary driver of his struggles.

One issue is Command and Control Fluctuations

Brown’s walk rate in relief (3.12 BB/9, adjusted) is higher than as a starter (2.94 BB/9), but his overall performance in relief is stronger (2.08 ERA vs. 4.36 ERA as a starter). This suggests that command inconsistencies, rather than stamina, contribute to his challenges.

In longer starts, such as April 26, 2025 (3.2 IP, 6 ER, 1 BB), or April 6, 2025 (4 IP, 5 ER, 4 BB), his high ER totals often stem from a combination of hits and walks, not just fatigue.

His 1.269 WHIP in relief (adjusted) indicates he allows baserunners, but his ability to avoid home runs (0.00 HR/9 in relief) shows he can manage damage when fresh. The issue is less about sustaining energy and more about maintaining precise pitch location over multiple innings.

But again, batters adjust.

Brown’s batted ball data shows vulnerability to hard contact and fly balls as a starter, with a 43.4% HardHit% and 7.4% Barrel% in 2025, alongside a 1.09 HR/9.

In relief, he allowed zero home runs over 17.1 innings (adjusted to remove the extreme outlier of his first MLB appearance), despite similar hard-hit rates in some outings (e.g., 40% on May 19, 2024). 

This discrepancy suggests that hitters, seeing his pitches multiple times in a start, make better contact, leading to more damaging outcomes like home runs. The problem lies in hitters’ ability to anticipate his fastball or knuckle curve, not in Brown lacking the stamina to pitch effectively.

And his success as a reliever shows it’s not stamina

Brown’s relief outings demonstrate his ability to pitch effectively for 2-4 innings, such as 3.2 IP with 0 ER on May 10, 2024, and 4 IP with 1 ER on April 3, 2024. These performances, averaging 2.47 innings per relief appearance (17.1 IP / 7 outings), align with the demands of a multi-inning reliever role.

His 2.08 ERA and 1.35 FIP in relief (adjusted) show he can sustain effectiveness over multiple innings without the sharp decline seen in later innings as a starter (5.43 ERA in innings 4-6). This indicates that his struggles in longer starts are not due to stamina limitations but rather to facing lineups multiple times, where his two-pitch mix becomes less effective.

Ok, so add another pitch!?

Ben Brown’s two-pitch arsenal—a four-seam fastball (44.6%-60% usage, 95-97 mph, ~95.4 mph avg. in 2025) and a knuckle curve (30-53.8% usage, 85-87 mph, 51% whiff rate, 124 Stuff+ in 2024)—is highly effective in short bursts.

In relief (7 appearances, excluding March 30, 2024), he posted a 2.08 ERA, 12.98 K/9, 0.00 HR/9, and 1.35 FIP over 17.1 innings. His knuckle curve, with a .134 expected batting average (xBA), drives his elite strikeout ability, and his fastball generates ground balls despite below-average whiff rates (<19%).

The success of this mix in relief and his first-inning dominance as a starter (0.00 ERA) suggest that the issue in longer outings is not the lack of a third pitch but rather hitters seeing his pitches multiple times, adapting to their patterns.

Again… hitters adjust….

Brown’s performance as a starter declines sharply after the first inning (0.00 ERA) to 5.56 ERA in innings 2-3 and 5.43 ERA in innings 4-6. This drop-off is likely due to hitters adjusting to his two-pitch mix after initial exposure. In relief, where he faces lineups once or twice, his 12.98 K/9 and zero home runs indicate that his fastball and knuckle curve remain effective when exposure is limited.

Adding a third pitch (e.g., refining his rarely used changeup, <2% usage) might delay hitter adjustment slightly, but it wouldn’t fundamentally address the issue of predictability over multiple plate appearances. The core problem is his reliance on two pitches in extended outings, not the absence of another option, as evidenced by his struggles persisting even in starts where he maintained velocity (95-97 mph).

Again, control….

Brown’s higher walk rate in relief (3.12 BB/9, adjusted) compared to starting (2.94 BB/9) and his 1.269 WHIP in relief suggest command inconsistencies, even in shorter stints. In starts with high earned runs, such as April 26, 2025 (3.2 IP, 6 ER, 1 BB) or April 6, 2025 (4 IP, 5 ER, 4 BB), walks and hits often combine to inflate damage, not just pitch predictability. His fastball’s below-average whiff rate (<19%) stems from inconsistent shape and location (less run in 2025), not a lack of variety. Adding a new pitch requires mastering its command, which could exacerbate his existing control issues, as seen with his rarely used changeup (25% whiff rate but fly-ball heavy). Improving execution of his current pitches would likely yield greater immediate benefits than developing a new one.

Plus…. Risk of Disrupting Current Strengths

Introducing a new pitch, such as a slider, cutter, or refined changeup, carries significant risks. Brown’s knuckle curve is his standout pitch, with a 51% whiff rate and .134 xBA, and his fastball complements it effectively in relief (2.08 ERA, 0.00 HR/9). Learning a new pitch could disrupt his confidence and rhythm with these elite offerings, potentially reducing their effectiveness. For example, his cutter, debuted in 2025 at 90 mph, showed promise (5 inches of horizontal break) but was used minimally, suggesting he’s not yet comfortable with it. The time and effort required to integrate a new pitch—potentially over a full season—may detract from refining his fastball command or knuckle curve consistency, which are already proven assets in short stints.

I know… I know… there is more…. Injuries…

Introducing a new pitch—such as a slider, cutter (debuted minimally in 2025 at 90 mph), or refined changeup—poses significant risks given Brown’s injury history.


The 2017 Tommy John surgery indicates a history of elbow stress, and adding a pitch like a slider, which places high torque on the UCL, could increase the risk of re-injury. The 2022 oblique strain suggests core stability issues, critical for generating torque on new pitches like a changeup, which requires precise arm and body coordination.

The 2024 neck strain disrupted his mechanics, leading to a post-injury ERA spike (4.74 vs. 2.96 pre-injury), and learning a new pitch could further strain his neck or shoulder if compensatory mechanics develop.

Brown’s knuckle curve and fastball are already effective (2.08 ERA in relief), and the physical toll of developing a new pitch may outweigh potential benefits, especially when his struggles are tied to hitter familiarity rather than pitch variety.

For example…

Brown’s command issues are evident in his walk rates: 3.12 BB/9 in relief (adjusted) and 2.94 BB/9 as a starter, with a 1.269 WHIP in relief. High-ER starts, like April 26, 2025 (3.2 IP, 6 ER, 1 BB) or April 6, 2025 (4 IP, 5 ER, 4 BB), often stem from walks and hits, not just pitch predictability. His fastball’s below-average whiff rate (<19%) results from inconsistent shape and location (less run in 2025), exacerbated post-neck strain in 2024, which likely disrupted his mechanics. The 2017 Tommy John surgery and 2022 oblique strain may further contribute to subtle mechanical flaws under fatigue, impacting command in longer outings.

And Risk Of Injury

Tommy John Recurrence: MLB pitchers have a 5-10% chance of requiring revision surgery post-Tommy John, with Brown’s risk in this range due to his 2017 surgery and high-velocity pitching. Roles with moderate pitch counts (multi-inning reliever, short starter) are safer than the closer’s frequent, high-intensity outings.

Neck Strain Recurrence: Pitchers face a 20-30% risk of neck strain recurrence or related injuries, elevated for Brown due to his 2022 oblique strain. His 2024 relief success (2.08 ERA) post-neck strain favors multi-inning relief, where he can manage mechanics over 2-4 innings, over closing, which demands precision under pressure.

Ok, fine, you sold me… why not be a closer?

Closers require pinpoint command to avoid walks in tight ninth-inning situations, as even one baserunner can jeopardize a save. Brown’s 3.12 BB/9 in 2024 relief (adjusted, 17.1 IP) and 10.13 BB/9 in his 2025 relief outing (2.2 IP, 3 BB) indicate control inconsistencies that are problematic for a closer. His 1.269 WHIP in 2024 relief and 2.625 WHIP in 2025 relief reflect a tendency to allow baserunners, which is riskier in save situations where a single walk or hit can lead to a blown save. For comparison, elite closers like Josh Hader (1.58 BB/9 in 2024) maintain lower walk rates. As a multi-inning reliever, Brown’s command issues are less critical, as he can pitch 2-4 innings (e.g., 4 IP, 1 ER on April 3, 2024) and rely on his 12.98 K/9 to escape jams over a longer stint.

Closers routinely face maximum pressure, with leverage indices (pLI) often exceeding 2.0 in save situations. Brown’s 2024 relief outings averaged a pLI of ~0.75, with only two outings above 1.0 (1.31 on May 19, 1.14 on April 20), indicating most were low-to-moderate leverage. While he posted positive WPA (+0.28 overall, +0.20 on May 10), his 2025 relief outing had a -0.32 WPA at a pLI of 1.06, suggesting struggles in higher-pressure moments. His clutch performance (.180 AVG, 35% K rate with RISP) is promising, but the lack of consistent high-leverage exposure raises doubts about his readiness for the closer’s intense mental and situational demands.

Closers often rely on a dominant pitch or two but need unpredictability to face the heart of the lineup in the ninth. Brown’s knuckle curve (51% whiff rate, .134 xBA, 124 Stuff+) and fastball (95-97 mph, <19% whiff rate) are effective in relief (2.08 ERA, 12.98 K/9 in 2024), but his two-pitch mix may become predictable against top hitters in a closer role. His first-inning 0.00 ERA shows he surprises hitters initially, but as a starter, hitters adjust by innings 2-3 (5.56 ERA), suggesting elite batters could adapt even in one inning if his fastball command falters (below-average whiff rate).

Brown’s injury history—2017 Tommy John surgery, 2022 oblique strain, and 2024 neck strain—raises concerns about the high-intensity, frequent appearances of a closer (often 60-70 games per season, 1-1.5 IP per outing). The Tommy John surgery suggests long-term elbow durability risks, and the neck strain disrupted his 2024 starting mechanics (4.74 ERA post-injury), potentially affecting the max-effort pitches required in save situations. The oblique strain indicates core stability issues, which could resurface under the closer’s high-velocity demands. As a multi-inning reliever, Brown’s 2024 outings (avg. 2.47 IP, up to 4 IP) show he can handle moderate pitch counts (e.g., ~50-60 pitches) with less frequency (30-40 appearances), reducing strain. His 2.08 ERA and 1.35 FIP in 2024 relief, compared to a 4.36 ERA in 82.2 IP as a starter, suggest multi-inning relief better manages his injury risks. The 2025 relief outing’s control issues (10.13 BB/9) don’t negate this, as multi-inning roles allow more margin for error.

Brown’s reverse platoon split (.220 AVG vs. left-handers, .280 AVG vs. right-handers) is valuable but less optimal for a closer, who must face the heart of the lineup (often mixed or right-heavy) without matchup flexibility. For example, a 2024 Yankees lineup with right-handers like Aaron Judge could exploit his weaker split (.280 AVG). As a multi-inning reliever, managers can deploy him strategically against lefty-heavy segments (e.g., 4th-6th innings), leveraging his knuckle curve’s effectiveness vs. lefties (12-6 break). His 2024 relief data (17.1 IP) and 2025 first-inning stats confirm this split’s consistency, supporting a role where matchup planning is feasible. As a closer, he lacks the platoon neutrality of elite closers like Hader (.200 AVG vs. both sides), and his 43.4% HardHit% and 7.4% Barrel% (2025) raise concerns about hard contact in critical moments. Multi-inning relief spreads this risk over longer outings, where his 0.00 HR/9 mitigates damage.

And no… his first inning dominance does not follow to relief.

No, Ben Brown’s first-inning dominance as a starter does not fully carry over to his performance in relief appearances.

When starting games, Brown excels in the first inning, boasting: ERA: 0.00 and a WHIP: 0.50

These stats reflect his ability to begin games with exceptional command and effectiveness, likely due to being fresh and having a strategic advantage at the outset.

In contrast, his performance as a reliever shows more variability. Across 8 relief appearances totaling 19.0 innings, his overall stats are:  ERA: 4.74 and a WHIP: 1.526

While he has had strong outings—such as on May 19, 2025, when he pitched 2 innings with 0 earned runs and 3 strikeouts—there are also instances of struggle, like on March 18, 2025, when he allowed 2 earned runs in 2.2 innings. These numbers indicate that his dominance is less consistent in relief compared to his first-inning starts.

 

Ben Brown – Elite Pitcher or Wasted Promise?

A very interesting post popped up on X about Chicago Cubs pitcher Ben Brown and I thought I would dig deep on the topic: Should Ben Brown be moved to the bullpen?

Hang on for a surprise that no one saw coming.

First off… we have to acknowledge he only has roughly 19 inning of relief as compared to roughly 80 as a starting pitcher, so the data is small all around. That said, at a SURFACE GLANCE:

His strengths as a Starter vs Relief: Lower ERA, WHIP, and BB/9, along with a higher K/BB.

Strengths as a Reliever vs Starter: Higher K/9 and lower HR/9, combined with a better FIP

But when you dig below, you get…. Major First-Inning Dominance…

Brown is exceptionally strong in the first inning, posting a 0.00 ERA and a 0.50 WHIP across his starts. His effectiveness drops the second he leaves the first, and progressively turns into a clown show.

As a starter, here is his ERA by inning.

Inning 1st – 0.00

2nd – 5.56

3rd – 5.56

4th – 4.50

5th – 5.40

6th – 7.04

He also has a skill…. A rare reverse split…. for a pitcher.

As a right-handed pitcher, Brown performs better against left-handed batters, allowing a .220 batting average and striking out 10.5 batters per 9 innings, compared to a .280 average and 9.8 K/9 against right-handed hitters.

Additionally, Brown excels in high-pressure situations, limiting hitters to a .180 batting average and achieving a 35% strikeout rate with runners in scoring position. But… A low-leverage long-relief role (e.g., mop-up duty in blowout games) underutilizes his clutch performance, placing him in situations where his ability to generate strikeouts under pressure is less impactful.

But Stamina Is An Issue….

Brown’s performance as a starter declines significantly after the third inning (5.40 ERA in innings 4-6). A long-relief role requiring multiple innings would expose this weakness, prolonged exposure to hitters increases his vulnerability to hard contact and home runs. The Relief Role (limited data) magnifies his issues… In relief appearances, Brown’s walk rate spikes to 3.79 BB/9 compared to 2.94 BB/9 as a starter. A long-relief role, where he faces multiple batters without the structured preparation of a starter, could amplify control issues, leading to more baserunners (evidenced by his 1.526 WHIP in relief).

Additionally, his limited pitch arsenal hurts him. His reliance on a fastball-slider combo (95-97 mph fastball, 85-87 mph slider) is effective in short bursts but becomes predictable over multiple innings. In a long-relief role, hitters would have more opportunities to adjust to his two-pitch mix, especially given his low changeup usage (1-7%), increasing the likelihood of hard contact.

So…. where is this leading?

First – what is the ABSOLUTE WORST ROLE FOR BEN BROW? The absolute worst role for Ben Brown would be as a traditional starting pitcher expected to pitch six or more innings per start. This role forces him into prolonged outings where his stamina falters, his pitch mix becomes predictable, and his weaknesses lead to poor outcomes, underutilizing his ability to dominate in short, high-impact appearances.

Now I know… I can year you….But…. his relief data looks a litterbox after a cat had diarrhea? Control Issues, Inconsistency, higher K/9, higher BB/9, higher WHIP…. And you are right BUT if you remove his horrifically bad relief appearance (which was his very first mlb game) – March 30, 2024, where he allowed 6 earned runs in 1.2 innings – the story becomes completely different.

Excluding the March 30, 2024 outing, Ben Brown’s relief performance is outstanding: a 2.08 ERA, 12.98 K/9, and 1.35 FIP across 7 appearances. No home runs allowed and a positive WPA of 0.28, he proves to be a reliable, stable and impactful bullpen arm.

Ok, we get it – he has skill but can’t pull it together.  What are you saying?

Well, the data today shows that the ULTIMTE role for Ben Brown, if you really wanted to take advantage of him and play to his skill: Short Starter or Opener This position capitalizes on his early-game dominance (0.00 ERA in the first inning, 2.08 ERA in relief), leverages his ability to handle 2-3 innings, and avoids the sharp decline seen in later innings (5.56 ERA in innings 2-3, 5.43 ERA in innings 4-6). It also offers team flexibility and manageable workload, making it the best fit for both his skills and the team’s needs.

A close second to the ultimate role: Multi-Inning Reliever.

A multi-inning reliever role allows deployment in varied situations—such as against the heart of the order in the middle innings—where his strikeout ability and clutch performance can shine. Additionally, as a reliever, he provides the element of surprise, as hitters haven’t faced him earlier, and he can pitch more frequently based on need, enhancing team flexibility.

The elite strikeout ability, proven effectiveness over 2-4 innings in relief, consistent performance in that role, and versatility make him well-suited as a multi-inning reliever. This allows the team to minimize his late-inning struggles as a starter, leverages his strengths in high-leverage situations, and aligns with his stamina with innings pitched.

And there you have it.

Is Pete Crow-Armstrong the Cubs’ Secret Weapon in the Leadoff Spot?

Alright, Cubs fans, let’s talk about Pete Crow-Armstrong (PCA) in the leadoff role. 

I’ll admit, I was one of the doubters, side-eyeing the decision to put him at the top of the lineup. But the stats? Oh, they’re telling a different story, and I’m eating my words. PCA is absolutely on fire as the Cubs’ leadoff hitter, and it’s time we dive into the numbers to see what’s fueling this blaze.

Spoiler: it’s not just PCA lighting it up—Dansby Swanson and Nico Hoerner are riding this wave too.

PCA’s Leadoff: The Numbers Don’t Lie
The Chicago Cubs made a bold move placing PCA in the leadoff spot, and the data from two key periods—before May 10 (7 games) and on/after May 10 (7 games)—shows he’s thriving. Here’s the tale of the tape:

Before May 10 (May 2–May 9)

Strikeouts: 7
Walks: 2
OBP: ~0.321
Slugging: ~0.654
Hits: 7 (3 singles, 1 double, 3 HR)
RBIs: 6
Stolen Bases: 0
Team Record: 3-4 (4.71 runs/game)

On/After May 10 (May 10–May 17)

Strikeouts: 11
Walks: 1
OBP: ~0.387
Slugging: ~0.733
Hits: 11 (7 singles, 1 triple, 3 HR)
RBIs: 11
Stolen Bases: 2
Team Record: 5-2 (5.57 runs/game)

So, what’s up?

PCA’s strikeouts spiked (7 to 11), and walks dipped (2 to 1), suggesting he’s swinging more aggressively. But the payoff? His OBP jumped from 0.321 to 0.387, slugging climbed from 0.654 to 0.733, and he’s racking up hits and RBIs like it’s his job. The Cubs went from a 3-4 record to 5-2, scoring nearly one more run per game (4.71 to 5.57).

Pitch Types: Is PCA Seeing the Ball Better?
Let’s get nerdy with the pitches PCA’s facing, because this might be the key to his success:

Before May 10
Fastball (FB): 43.0%
Slider (SL): 25.1%
Cutter (CT): 1.8%
Curveball (CB): 19.0%
Changeup (CH): 9.6%
Split-Finger (SF): 1.5%

On/After May 10
Fastball (FB): 40.1%
Slider (SL): 29.0%
Cutter (CT): 7.3%
Curveball (CB): 9.2%
Changeup (CH): 13.5%
Split-Finger (SF): 1.0%

Notice anything?

Cutters jumped from 1.8% to 7.3%, while curveballs plummeted from 19.0% to 9.2%. Changeups also ticked up (9.6% to 13.5%). Could this shift be why PCA’s crushing it? Maybe he’s feasting on cutters and changeups while seeing fewer tricky curveballs. And when fastballs dip below 40%, his weighted On-Base Average (wOBA) tends to shine.

Plate Discipline: Smarter Swings, Harder Hits
PCA’s not just swinging for the fences; he’s getting selective. Check out his plate discipline evolution:

Before May 10
O-Swing% (swings at pitches outside the zone): 54.6%
Z-Swing% (swings at pitches in the zone): 69.8%
Contact% (contact on swings): 64.9%
Swinging Strike%: 22.2%
Average Exit Velocity: 91.1 mph

On/After May 10
O-Swing%: 47.4%
Z-Swing%: 83.9%
Contact%: 68.2%
Swinging Strike%: 19.8%
Average Exit Velocity: 93.7 mph

Translation?

PCA’s chasing fewer bad pitches, hammering more strikes, and making better contact. His exit velocity bumped from 91.1 mph to 93.7 mph, meaning he’s hitting the ball harder. This guy’s not just getting on base—he’s setting the table for the Cubs’ offense.

Home vs. Away: Where Does PCA Shine?
PCA’s a road warrior, but he’s no slouch at Wrigley either:

Home (8 games): 11 hits in 34 plate appearances, wOBA 0.422
Away (6 games): 7 hits in 25 plate appearances, wOBA 0.456

More hits at home, but a higher wOBA on the road.

But Wait, There’s More: Swanson and Hoerner Step Up
PCA’s not the only one thriving. Dansby Swanson and Nico Hoerner are feasting with PCA at leadoff:

Dansby Swanson WPA: Before: -0.063, After: 0.763
Nico Hoerner WPA: Before: 0.083, After: 0.691

Swanson’s move up the lineup (from mostly 8th to 5th-7th, once 1st) is a big deal:

Batting 8th (Before May 10): BA 0.217, OBP 0.308, SLG 0.478, WPA 0.177
Batting 5th-7th, Once 1st (On/After May 10): BA 0.348, OBP 0.464, SLG 0.609, WPA 0.524

Other Cubs Notes

Ian Happ: Slight batting average bump.
Seiya Suzuki: Big rebound across the board.
Michael Busch: Consistent BA and OBP, but his slugging dipped.
Kyle Tucker: BA, OBP, SLG, and WPA tanked (WPA from 0.592 to -0.321).

Final Thoughts
I didn’t see this coming, but PCA’s proving me wrong in the best way. The Cubs’ leadoff experiment is paying off, and with Swanson and Hoerner riding the wave, Chicago’s offense is looking dangerous.

Keep an eye on those pitch types and plate discipline. I suspect the opposing team will (if they haven’t already) pick up on these signals and adjust how they approach him.

 

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