Hello Friends! 

Who knew Ben Brown could be so interesting.  As much fans may want Ben to be a starter, or be as a closer…. The data still tells us… No…. No….

This is a huge string. Once folks started asking questions, I started digging and it just kept going.

Let’s get to it.

No – building stamina isn’t Brown’s Key… because Stamina Isn’t the Core Issue

While Brown’s performance drops after the third inning as a starter (5.40 ERA in innings 4-6), this decline does not appear to solely due to physical fatigue. It’s his pitch mix. Hitters adjust to his two-pitch mix after seeing it multiple times in a game.

Building stamina might extend his outings, but it wouldn’t necessarily solve this adjustment problem. His struggles in later innings suggest a limitation in his current approach as a starter, not a lack of endurance that stamina training alone could fix.

Bah!  That doesn’t show anything. How do you know it’s not a core issue? 

If stamina were the core issue, we would expect Brown’s fastball velocity to drop significantly in later innings, reflecting physical fatigue. However, his fastball velocity remains stable at 95-97 mph across both starting and relief roles, with no notable decline reported in the data for later innings.

For example, in his 7-inning start on May 28, 2024, he maintained effectiveness (0 ER, 10 SO), suggesting that when he performs well, his velocity and pitch quality hold up. The lack of velocity drop points to hitter familiarity or execution issues, not a lack of endurance, as the primary driver of his struggles.

One issue is Command and Control Fluctuations

Brown’s walk rate in relief (3.12 BB/9, adjusted) is higher than as a starter (2.94 BB/9), but his overall performance in relief is stronger (2.08 ERA vs. 4.36 ERA as a starter). This suggests that command inconsistencies, rather than stamina, contribute to his challenges.

In longer starts, such as April 26, 2025 (3.2 IP, 6 ER, 1 BB), or April 6, 2025 (4 IP, 5 ER, 4 BB), his high ER totals often stem from a combination of hits and walks, not just fatigue.

His 1.269 WHIP in relief (adjusted) indicates he allows baserunners, but his ability to avoid home runs (0.00 HR/9 in relief) shows he can manage damage when fresh. The issue is less about sustaining energy and more about maintaining precise pitch location over multiple innings.

But again, batters adjust.

Brown’s batted ball data shows vulnerability to hard contact and fly balls as a starter, with a 43.4% HardHit% and 7.4% Barrel% in 2025, alongside a 1.09 HR/9.

In relief, he allowed zero home runs over 17.1 innings (adjusted to remove the extreme outlier of his first MLB appearance), despite similar hard-hit rates in some outings (e.g., 40% on May 19, 2024). 

This discrepancy suggests that hitters, seeing his pitches multiple times in a start, make better contact, leading to more damaging outcomes like home runs. The problem lies in hitters’ ability to anticipate his fastball or knuckle curve, not in Brown lacking the stamina to pitch effectively.

And his success as a reliever shows it’s not stamina

Brown’s relief outings demonstrate his ability to pitch effectively for 2-4 innings, such as 3.2 IP with 0 ER on May 10, 2024, and 4 IP with 1 ER on April 3, 2024. These performances, averaging 2.47 innings per relief appearance (17.1 IP / 7 outings), align with the demands of a multi-inning reliever role.

His 2.08 ERA and 1.35 FIP in relief (adjusted) show he can sustain effectiveness over multiple innings without the sharp decline seen in later innings as a starter (5.43 ERA in innings 4-6). This indicates that his struggles in longer starts are not due to stamina limitations but rather to facing lineups multiple times, where his two-pitch mix becomes less effective.

Ok, so add another pitch!?

Ben Brown’s two-pitch arsenal—a four-seam fastball (44.6%-60% usage, 95-97 mph, ~95.4 mph avg. in 2025) and a knuckle curve (30-53.8% usage, 85-87 mph, 51% whiff rate, 124 Stuff+ in 2024)—is highly effective in short bursts.

In relief (7 appearances, excluding March 30, 2024), he posted a 2.08 ERA, 12.98 K/9, 0.00 HR/9, and 1.35 FIP over 17.1 innings. His knuckle curve, with a .134 expected batting average (xBA), drives his elite strikeout ability, and his fastball generates ground balls despite below-average whiff rates (<19%).

The success of this mix in relief and his first-inning dominance as a starter (0.00 ERA) suggest that the issue in longer outings is not the lack of a third pitch but rather hitters seeing his pitches multiple times, adapting to their patterns.

Again… hitters adjust….

Brown’s performance as a starter declines sharply after the first inning (0.00 ERA) to 5.56 ERA in innings 2-3 and 5.43 ERA in innings 4-6. This drop-off is likely due to hitters adjusting to his two-pitch mix after initial exposure. In relief, where he faces lineups once or twice, his 12.98 K/9 and zero home runs indicate that his fastball and knuckle curve remain effective when exposure is limited.

Adding a third pitch (e.g., refining his rarely used changeup, <2% usage) might delay hitter adjustment slightly, but it wouldn’t fundamentally address the issue of predictability over multiple plate appearances. The core problem is his reliance on two pitches in extended outings, not the absence of another option, as evidenced by his struggles persisting even in starts where he maintained velocity (95-97 mph).

Again, control….

Brown’s higher walk rate in relief (3.12 BB/9, adjusted) compared to starting (2.94 BB/9) and his 1.269 WHIP in relief suggest command inconsistencies, even in shorter stints. In starts with high earned runs, such as April 26, 2025 (3.2 IP, 6 ER, 1 BB) or April 6, 2025 (4 IP, 5 ER, 4 BB), walks and hits often combine to inflate damage, not just pitch predictability. His fastball’s below-average whiff rate (<19%) stems from inconsistent shape and location (less run in 2025), not a lack of variety. Adding a new pitch requires mastering its command, which could exacerbate his existing control issues, as seen with his rarely used changeup (25% whiff rate but fly-ball heavy). Improving execution of his current pitches would likely yield greater immediate benefits than developing a new one.

Plus…. Risk of Disrupting Current Strengths

Introducing a new pitch, such as a slider, cutter, or refined changeup, carries significant risks. Brown’s knuckle curve is his standout pitch, with a 51% whiff rate and .134 xBA, and his fastball complements it effectively in relief (2.08 ERA, 0.00 HR/9). Learning a new pitch could disrupt his confidence and rhythm with these elite offerings, potentially reducing their effectiveness. For example, his cutter, debuted in 2025 at 90 mph, showed promise (5 inches of horizontal break) but was used minimally, suggesting he’s not yet comfortable with it. The time and effort required to integrate a new pitch—potentially over a full season—may detract from refining his fastball command or knuckle curve consistency, which are already proven assets in short stints.

I know… I know… there is more…. Injuries…

Introducing a new pitch—such as a slider, cutter (debuted minimally in 2025 at 90 mph), or refined changeup—poses significant risks given Brown’s injury history.

The 2017 Tommy John surgery indicates a history of elbow stress, and adding a pitch like a slider, which places high torque on the UCL, could increase the risk of re-injury. The 2022 oblique strain suggests core stability issues, critical for generating torque on new pitches like a changeup, which requires precise arm and body coordination.

The 2024 neck strain disrupted his mechanics, leading to a post-injury ERA spike (4.74 vs. 2.96 pre-injury), and learning a new pitch could further strain his neck or shoulder if compensatory mechanics develop.

Brown’s knuckle curve and fastball are already effective (2.08 ERA in relief), and the physical toll of developing a new pitch may outweigh potential benefits, especially when his struggles are tied to hitter familiarity rather than pitch variety.

For example…

Brown’s command issues are evident in his walk rates: 3.12 BB/9 in relief (adjusted) and 2.94 BB/9 as a starter, with a 1.269 WHIP in relief. High-ER starts, like April 26, 2025 (3.2 IP, 6 ER, 1 BB) or April 6, 2025 (4 IP, 5 ER, 4 BB), often stem from walks and hits, not just pitch predictability. His fastball’s below-average whiff rate (<19%) results from inconsistent shape and location (less run in 2025), exacerbated post-neck strain in 2024, which likely disrupted his mechanics. The 2017 Tommy John surgery and 2022 oblique strain may further contribute to subtle mechanical flaws under fatigue, impacting command in longer outings.

And Risk Of Injury

Tommy John Recurrence: MLB pitchers have a 5-10% chance of requiring revision surgery post-Tommy John, with Brown’s risk in this range due to his 2017 surgery and high-velocity pitching. Roles with moderate pitch counts (multi-inning reliever, short starter) are safer than the closer’s frequent, high-intensity outings.

Neck Strain Recurrence: Pitchers face a 20-30% risk of neck strain recurrence or related injuries, elevated for Brown due to his 2022 oblique strain. His 2024 relief success (2.08 ERA) post-neck strain favors multi-inning relief, where he can manage mechanics over 2-4 innings, over closing, which demands precision under pressure.

Ok, fine, you sold me… why not be a closer?

Closers require pinpoint command to avoid walks in tight ninth-inning situations, as even one baserunner can jeopardize a save. Brown’s 3.12 BB/9 in 2024 relief (adjusted, 17.1 IP) and 10.13 BB/9 in his 2025 relief outing (2.2 IP, 3 BB) indicate control inconsistencies that are problematic for a closer. His 1.269 WHIP in 2024 relief and 2.625 WHIP in 2025 relief reflect a tendency to allow baserunners, which is riskier in save situations where a single walk or hit can lead to a blown save. For comparison, elite closers like Josh Hader (1.58 BB/9 in 2024) maintain lower walk rates. As a multi-inning reliever, Brown’s command issues are less critical, as he can pitch 2-4 innings (e.g., 4 IP, 1 ER on April 3, 2024) and rely on his 12.98 K/9 to escape jams over a longer stint.

Closers routinely face maximum pressure, with leverage indices (pLI) often exceeding 2.0 in save situations. Brown’s 2024 relief outings averaged a pLI of ~0.75, with only two outings above 1.0 (1.31 on May 19, 1.14 on April 20), indicating most were low-to-moderate leverage. While he posted positive WPA (+0.28 overall, +0.20 on May 10), his 2025 relief outing had a -0.32 WPA at a pLI of 1.06, suggesting struggles in higher-pressure moments. His clutch performance (.180 AVG, 35% K rate with RISP) is promising, but the lack of consistent high-leverage exposure raises doubts about his readiness for the closer’s intense mental and situational demands.

Closers often rely on a dominant pitch or two but need unpredictability to face the heart of the lineup in the ninth. Brown’s knuckle curve (51% whiff rate, .134 xBA, 124 Stuff+) and fastball (95-97 mph, <19% whiff rate) are effective in relief (2.08 ERA, 12.98 K/9 in 2024), but his two-pitch mix may become predictable against top hitters in a closer role. His first-inning 0.00 ERA shows he surprises hitters initially, but as a starter, hitters adjust by innings 2-3 (5.56 ERA), suggesting elite batters could adapt even in one inning if his fastball command falters (below-average whiff rate).

Brown’s injury history—2017 Tommy John surgery, 2022 oblique strain, and 2024 neck strain—raises concerns about the high-intensity, frequent appearances of a closer (often 60-70 games per season, 1-1.5 IP per outing). The Tommy John surgery suggests long-term elbow durability risks, and the neck strain disrupted his 2024 starting mechanics (4.74 ERA post-injury), potentially affecting the max-effort pitches required in save situations. The oblique strain indicates core stability issues, which could resurface under the closer’s high-velocity demands. As a multi-inning reliever, Brown’s 2024 outings (avg. 2.47 IP, up to 4 IP) show he can handle moderate pitch counts (e.g., ~50-60 pitches) with less frequency (30-40 appearances), reducing strain. His 2.08 ERA and 1.35 FIP in 2024 relief, compared to a 4.36 ERA in 82.2 IP as a starter, suggest multi-inning relief better manages his injury risks. The 2025 relief outing’s control issues (10.13 BB/9) don’t negate this, as multi-inning roles allow more margin for error.

Brown’s reverse platoon split (.220 AVG vs. left-handers, .280 AVG vs. right-handers) is valuable but less optimal for a closer, who must face the heart of the lineup (often mixed or right-heavy) without matchup flexibility. For example, a 2024 Yankees lineup with right-handers like Aaron Judge could exploit his weaker split (.280 AVG). As a multi-inning reliever, managers can deploy him strategically against lefty-heavy segments (e.g., 4th-6th innings), leveraging his knuckle curve’s effectiveness vs. lefties (12-6 break). His 2024 relief data (17.1 IP) and 2025 first-inning stats confirm this split’s consistency, supporting a role where matchup planning is feasible. As a closer, he lacks the platoon neutrality of elite closers like Hader (.200 AVG vs. both sides), and his 43.4% HardHit% and 7.4% Barrel% (2025) raise concerns about hard contact in critical moments. Multi-inning relief spreads this risk over longer outings, where his 0.00 HR/9 mitigates damage.

And no… his first inning dominance does not follow to relief.

No, Ben Brown’s first-inning dominance as a starter does not fully carry over to his performance in relief appearances.

When starting games, Brown excels in the first inning, boasting: ERA: 0.00 and a WHIP: 0.50

These stats reflect his ability to begin games with exceptional command and effectiveness, likely due to being fresh and having a strategic advantage at the outset.

In contrast, his performance as a reliever shows more variability. Across 8 relief appearances totaling 19.0 innings, his overall stats are:  ERA: 4.74 and a WHIP: 1.526

While he has had strong outings—such as on May 19, 2025, when he pitched 2 innings with 0 earned runs and 3 strikeouts—there are also instances of struggle, like on March 18, 2025, when he allowed 2 earned runs in 2.2 innings. These numbers indicate that his dominance is less consistent in relief compared to his first-inning starts.